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Abstract
Should editors of scientific journals practice triple-blind reviewing?
I consider two arguments in favor of this claim. The first says that
insofar as editors’ decisions are affected by information they would not
have had under triple-blind review, an injustice is committed against
certain authors. I show that even well-meaning editors would commit
this wrong and I endorse this argument.
The second argument says that insofar as editors’ decisions are
affected by information they would not have had under triple-blind
review, it will negatively affect the quality of published papers. I
distinguish between two kinds of biases that an editor might have. I
show that one of them has a positive effect on quality and the other
a negative one, and that the combined effect could be either positive
or negative. Thus I do not endorse the second argument in general.
However, I do endorse this argument for certain fields, for which I
argue that the positive effect does not apply.
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1 Introduction
Journal editors occupy an important position in the scientific landscape. By
making the final decision on which papers get published in their journal and
which papers do not, they have a significant influence on what work is given
attention and what work is ignored in their field (Crane 1967).
In this paper I investigate the following question: should the editor be
informed about the identity of the author when she is deciding whether to
publish a particular paper? Under a single- or double-blind reviewing proce-
dure, the editor has access to information about the author, whereas under a
triple-blind reviewing procedure she does not. So in other words the question
is: should journals practice triple-blind reviewing?
Two kinds of arguments have been given in favor of triple-blind reviewing.
One focuses on the treatment of the author by the editor. On this kind of
argument, revealing identity information to the editor will lead the editor to
(partially) base her judgment on irrelevant information (such as the gender
of the author, or whether or not the editor is friends with the author). This
harms the author, and is thus bad.
The second kind of argument focuses on the effect on the journal and its
readers. Again, the idea is that the editor will base her judgment on identity
information if given the chance to do so. But now the further claim is that
as a result the journal will accept worse papers. After all, if a decision to
accept or reject a paper is influenced by the editor’s biases, this suggests that
a departure has been made from a putative “objectively correct” decision.
This harms the readers of the journal, and is thus bad.
Here I provide a philosophical discussion of the reviewing procedure to
assess these arguments. I distinguish between two different ways the editor’s
judgment may be affected if the author’s identity is revealed to her. First,
the editor may treat authors she knows differently from authors she does
not know. Second, the editor may treat authors differently based on their
membership of some group (e.g., gender bias). My discussion focuses on the
2
following three claims.
My first claim is that the first kind of differential treatment the editor may
display (based on whether she knows a particular author) actually benefits
rather than harms the readers of the journal. This benefit is the result of a
reduction in editorial uncertainty about the quality of submitted papers when
she knows their authors. I construct a model to show in a formally precise
way how such a benefit might arise—surprisingly, no assumption that the
scientists the editor knows are somehow “better scientists” is required—and
I cite empirical evidence that such a benefit indeed does arise. However, this
benefit only applies in certain fields. I argue that in other fields (in particular,
mathematics and the humanities) no significant reduction of uncertainty—
and hence no benefit to the readers—occurs (section 2).
My second claim is that either kind of differential treatment the editor
may display (based on whether she knows authors or based on bias against
certain groups) harms authors. I argue that any instance of such differential
treatment constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker (2007)
against the disadvantaged author. If the editor is to be (epistemically) just,
she should prevent such differential treatment, which can be done through
triple-blind reviewing. So I endorse an argument of the first of the two kinds
I identified above: triple-blind reviewing is preferable because not doing so
harms authors (section 3).
My third claim is that whether differential treatment also harms the jour-
nal and its readers depends on a number of factors. Differential treatment
by the editor based on whether she knows a particular author may benefit
readers, whereas differential treatment based on bias against certain groups
may harm them. Whether there is an overall benefit or harm depends on the
strength of the editor’s bias, the relative sizes of the different groups, and
other factors, as I illustrate using the model. As a result I do not in general
endorse the second kind of argument, that triple-blind reviewing is preferable
because readers of the journal are harmed otherwise. However, I do endorse
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this argument for fields like mathematics and the humanities, where I claim
that the benefits of differential treatment (based on uncertainty reduction)
do not apply (section 4).
Note that, in considering the ethical and epistemic effects of triple-blind
reviewing, a distinction is made between the effects on the author and the
effects on the readers of the journal. This reflects a growing understanding
that in order to study the social epistemology of science, what is good for
an individual inquirer must be distinguished from what is good for the wider
scientific community (Kitcher 1993, Strevens 2003, Mayo-Wilson et al. 2011).
Zollman (2009) has studied the effects of different editorial policies on the
number of papers published and the selection criteria for publication, but he
does not focus specifically on the editor’s decisions and the uncertainty she
faces. Economists have studied models in which editor decisions play an im-
portant role (Ellison 2002, Faria 2005, Besancenot et al. 2012), but they have
not distinguished between papers written by scientists the editor knows and
papers by scientists unknown to her, and neither have they been concerned
with biases the editor may be subject to. And some other economists have
done empirical work investigating the differences between papers with and
without an author-editor connection (Laband and Piette 1994, Medoff 2003,
Smith and Dombrowski 1998, more on this later), but they do not provide a
model that can explain these differences. This paper thus fills a gap in the
literature.
2 A Model of Editor Uncertainty
As I said in the introduction, journal editors have a certain measure of power
in a scientific community because they decide which papers get published.1
An editor could use this discretionary power to the benefit of her friends or
1Different journals may have different policies, such as one in which associate editors
make the final decision for papers in their (sub)field. Here, I simply define “the editor” to
be whomever makes the final decision whether to publish a particular paper.
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colleagues, or to promote certain subfields or methodologies over others. This
phenomenon has been called editorial favoritism. If anecdotal evidence is to
be believed, this phenomenon is widespread. Some systematic evidence of
favoritism exists as well. Bailey et al. (2008a,b) find that academics believe
editorial favoritism to be fairly prevalent, with a nonnegligible percentage
claiming to have perceived it firsthand. Laband (1985) and Piette and Ross
(1992) find that, controlling for citation impact and various other factors,
papers whose author has a connection to the journal editor are allocated
more journal pages than papers by authors without such a connection.2
In this paper, I refer to the phenomenon that editors are more likely to
accept papers from authors they know than papers from authors they do not
know as connection bias.
Academics tend to disapprove of this behavior (Sherrell et al. 1989, Bailey
et al. 2008a,b). In both of the studies by Bailey et al., in which subjects were
asked to rate the seriousness of various potentially problematic behaviors by
editors and reviewers, this disapproval was shown (using a factor analysis) to
be part of a general and strong disapproval of “selfish or cliquish acts” in the
peer review process. Thus it appears that the reason for the disapproval of
editors publishing papers by their friends and colleagues is that it shows the
editor acting on private interests, rather than displaying the disinterestedness
that is the norm in science (Merton 1942).
On the other hand, if connection bias was a serious worry for authors,
one would expect this to be a major consideration for them in choosing
where to submit their papers (i.e., submit to journals where they know the
editor), but Ziobrowski and Gibler (2000) find that this is not the case.3
2Here, page allocation is used as a proxy for journal editors’ willingness to push the
paper. The more obvious variable to use here would be whether or not the paper is
accepted for publication. Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies which measure
the influence of a relationship between the author and the editor on acceptance decisions
directly. Presumably this is because information about rejected papers is usually not
available in these kinds of studies.
3In particular, authors who know an editor and thus could expect to profit from con-
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Moreover, despite working scientists’ disapproval, there is some evidence that
connection bias improves the overall quality of accepted papers (Laband and
Piette 1994, Medoff 2003, Smith and Dombrowski 1998). Does that mean
scientists are misguided in their disapproval?
As indicated in the introduction, I distinguish between the effects of ed-
itors’ biases on the authors of scientific papers on the one hand, and the
effects on the readers of scientific journals on the other hand. In this section,
I use a formal model to show that these two can come apart: connection
bias may negatively affect scientists as authors while positively affecting sci-
entists as readers. Note that in this section I focus only on connection bias.
Subsequent sections consider other biases.
Consider a simplified scientific community consisting of a set of scientists.
Each scientist produces a paper and submits it to the community’s only
journal which has one editor.
Some papers are more suitable for publication than others. I assume that
this suitability for publication can be measured on a single numerical scale.
For convenience I call this the quality of the paper. However, I remain neutral
on how this notion should be interpreted, e.g., as an objective measure of
the epistemic value of the paper (which is perhaps an aggregate of multiple
relevant criteria), or as the number of times the paper would be cited in
future papers if it was published, or as the average subjective value each
member of the scientific community would assign to it if they read it.4
nection bias would find knowing the editor and the composition of the editorial board more
generally to be important factors in deciding where to submit, contrary to Ziobrowski and
Gibler’s evidence (these factors are ranked twelfth and sixteenth in importance in a list
of sixteen factors that might influence the decision where to submit). Similarly, authors
who do not know an editor would find a lack of (perceived) connection bias and the com-
position of the editorial board to be important factors, but these rank only seventh and
twelfth in importance in Ziobrowski and Gibler’s study. In a similar survey by Mackie
(1998, chapter 4), twenty percent of authors indicated that knowing the editor and/or her
preferences is an important consideration in deciding where to submit a paper.
4For more on potential difficulties with interpreting the notion of quality, see Bright
(2015).
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Crucially, the editor does not know the quality of the paper at the time
it is submitted. The aim of this section is to show how uncertainty about
quality can lead to connection bias. To make this point as starkly as possible,
I assume that the editor cares only about quality, i.e., she makes an estimate
of the quality of a paper and publishes those and only those papers whose
quality estimate is high.
Let qi be the quality of the paper submitted by scientist i. Since there
is uncertainty about the quality, qi is modeled as a random variable. Since
some scientists are more likely to produce high quality papers than others,
the mean µi of this random variable may be different for each scientist. I
assume that quality follows a normal distribution with fixed variance: qi |
µi ∼ N(µi, σ2qu).
The assumptions of normality and fixed variance are made primarily to
keep the mathematics simple. Below I make similar assumptions on the dis-
tribution of average quality in the scientific community and the distribution
of reviewers’ estimates of the quality of a paper. I see no reason to expect
the results I present below to be different when any of these assumptions are
changed.
If the editor knows scientist i, she has some prior information on the av-
erage quality of scientist i’s work. This is reflected in the model by assuming
that the editor knows the value of µi. For scientists she does not know, the
editor is uncertain about the average quality of their work. All she knows is
the distribution of average quality in the larger scientific community, which
I also assume to be normal: µi ∼ N(µ, σ2sc).
Note that I assume the scientific community to be homogeneous: the
scientific community is split in two groups (those known by the editor and
those not known by the editor) but average paper quality follows the same
distribution in both groups. If I assumed instead that scientists known by
the editor write better papers on average the results would be qualitatively
similar to those I present below. If scientists known by the editor write worse
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papers on average this would affect my results. However, since most journal
editors are relatively central figures in their field (Crane 1967), this would be
an implausible assumption except perhaps in isolated cases.
The editor’s prior beliefs about the quality of a paper submitted by some
scientist i reflects this difference in information. If she knows the scientist
she knows the value of µi, and so her prior is pi(qi | µi) ∼ N(µi, σ2qu). If the
editor does not know scientist i she only knows the distribution of µi, rather
than its exact value. Integrating out the uncertainty over µi yields a prior
pi(qi) ∼ N(µ, σ2qu + σ2sc) for the quality of scientist i’s paper.
When the editor receives a paper she sends it out for review. In the
context of this model, the main purpose of the reviewer’s report is to provide
an estimate of the quality of the paper. But, I assume, even after reading the
paper its quality cannot be established with certainty. Thus the reviewer’s
estimate ri of the quality qi is again a random variable. I assume that the
reviewer’s report is unbiased, i.e., its mean is the actual quality qi of the
paper. Once again I use a normal distribution to reflect the uncertainty:
ri | qi ∼ N(qi, σ2rv).5
The editor uses the information from the reviewer’s report to update her
beliefs about the quality of scientist i’s paper. I assume that she does this
by Bayes conditioning. Thus, her posterior beliefs about the quality of the
paper are pi(qi | ri) if she does not know the author, and pi(qi | ri, µi) if she
does.
The posterior distributions are themselves normal distributions whose
5The reviewer’s report could reflect the opinion of a single reviewer, or the averaged
opinion of multiple reviewers. The editor could even act as a reviewer herself, in which
case the report reflects her findings which she has to incorporate in her overall beliefs
about the quality of the paper. The assumption I make in the text can be used to cover
any of these scenarios, as long as a given journal is fairly consistent in the number of
reviewers used. If the number of reviewers is frequently different for different papers (and
in particular when this difference correlates with the existence or absence of a connection
between editor and author) the assumption of a fixed variance in the reviewer’s report is
unrealistic because a report from multiple reviewers may be thought to give more accurate
information (reducing the variance) than a report from a single reviewer.
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mean is a weighted average of ri and the prior mean, as given in proposition 1
(for a proof, see DeGroot 2004, section 9.5, or any other textbook that covers
Bayesian statistics).
Proposition 1.
pi(qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUi ,
(σ2qu + σ2sc)σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
)
,
pi(qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
)
,
where
µUi =
σ2qu + σ2sc
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
µ,
µKi =
σ2qu
σ2qu + σ2rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
µi.
When does the editor choose to publish a paper? Here I assume that she
publishes any paper whose posterior mean is above some threshold q∗. So
a paper written by a scientist unknown to the editor is published if µUi >
q∗ and a paper written by a scientist known to the editor is published if
µKi > q
∗. This corresponds to being at least 50% confident that the paper’s
quality is above the threshold. Other standards could be used (risk-averse
standards might require more than 50% confidence that the paper is above
some threshold, while risk-loving standards might require less; in these cases
the threshold value needs to be adapted to keep the total number of accepted
papers constant) but for my purposes here it does not much matter.
Now compare the probability that the paper of an arbitrary scientist i
unknown to the editor is published to the probability that the paper of an
arbitrary scientist known by the editor is published. For this purpose it is
useful to determine the probability distribution of the posterior means (see
appendix A for proofs of this and subsequent results).
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Proposition 2. The posterior means are normally distributed, with µUi ∼
N (µ, σ2U) and µKi ∼ N (µ, σ2K). Here,
σ2U =
(σ2qu + σ2sc)2
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
and σ2K =
σ4qu + σ2sc(σ2qu + σ2rv)
σ2qu + σ2rv
.
Moreover, if σ2sc > 0 and σ2rv > 0, then σ2U < σ2K.
The main result of this section, which establishes the existence of con-
nection bias in the model, is a consequence of proposition 2. It says that
the editor is more likely to publish a paper written by an arbitrary author
she knows than a paper written by an arbitrary author she does not know,
whenever q∗ > µ (for any positive value of σ2sc and σ2rv). Since q∗ = µ would
mean that exactly half of all papers gets published, the condition amounts
to a requirement that the journal’s acceptance rate is less than 50%. This
is true of most reputable journals in most fields (physics being a notable
exception). When acceptance rates are above 50% editorial favoritism is also
much less of a concern in the first place.
Theorem 3. If q∗ > µ, σ2sc > 0, and σ2rv > 0, the acceptance probability
for authors known to the editor is higher than the acceptance probability for
authors unknown to the editor, i.e., Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
> Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
.
Theorem 3 shows that in the model I presented, any journal with an
acceptance rate lower than 50% will be seen to display connection bias. Thus
I have established the surprising result that an editor who cares only about
the quality of the papers she publishes may end up publishing more papers
by her friends and colleagues than by scientists unknown to her, even if her
friends and colleagues are not, as a group, better scientists than average.
Why does this surprising result hold? The theorem follows immediately
from proposition 2, which says that the distribution of µUi is less “spread
out” than the distribution of µKi (σ2U < σ2K). This happens because µUi is a
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weighted average of µ and ri, keeping it relatively close to the overall mean µ
compared to µKi , which is a weighted average of µi and ri (which tend to
differ from µ in the same direction).
Because the editor treats papers by authors she knows differently from
papers by authors she does not know, authors unknown to the editor are
arguably harmed. I pick up this point in section 3 and argue that this
constitutes an epistemic injustice against those authors.
What I have shown so far is that an editor who uses information about the
average quality of papers produced by scientists she knows in her acceptance
decisions will find that scientists she knows produce on average more papers
that meet her quality threshold. This is a subjective statement: the editor
believes that more papers by scientists she knows meet her threshold. Does
this translate into an objective effect? That is, does the extra information
the editor has available about scientists she knows allow her to publish better
papers from them than from scientists she does not know?
In order to answer this question I need to compare the average quality of
accepted papers. More formally, I want to compare the expected value of the
quality of a paper, conditional on meeting the publication threshold, given
that the author is either known to the editor or not.
Proposition 4. If σ2sc > 0, and σ2rv > 0, the average quality of accepted
papers from authors known to the editor is higher than the average quality of
accepted papers from authors unknown to the editor, i.e., E[qi | µKi > q∗] >
E[qi | µUi > q∗].
Proposition 4 shows that the editor can use the extra information she
has about scientists she knows to improve the average quality of the papers
published in her journal. In other words, the surprising result is that the
editor’s connection bias actually benefits rather than harms the readers of
the journal. It is thus fair to say that, in the model, the editor can use her
connections to “identify and capture high-quality papers”, as Laband and
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Piette (1994) suggest.6
To what extent does this show that the connection bias observed in reality
is the result of editors capturing high-quality papers, as opposed to editors
using their position of power to help their friends? At this point the model
is seen to yield an empirical prediction. If connection bias is (primarily) due
to capturing high-quality papers, the quality of papers by authors the editor
knows should be higher than average, as shown in the model. If, on the
other hand, connection bias is (primarily) a result of the editor accepting
for publication papers written by authors she knows even though they do
not meet the quality standards of the journal, then the quality of papers by
authors the editor knows should (presumably) be lower than average.
If subsequent citations are a good indication of the quality of a paper,7 a
simple regression can test whether accepted papers written by authors with
an author-editor connection have a higher or a lower average quality than
papers without such a connection. This empirical test has been carried out a
number of times, and the results univocally favor the hypothesis that editors
use their connections to improve the quality of published papers (Laband
and Piette 1994, Smith and Dombrowski 1998, Medoff 2003).
Note that in the above results, nothing depends on the sizes of the vari-
ances σ2qu, σ2sc, and σ2rv. This is because these results are qualitative. The
variances do matter when the acceptance rate and average quality of papers
are compared quantitatively. For example, reducing σ2rv (making the re-
viewer’s report more accurate) makes the differences in the acceptance rate
and average quality of papers smaller.
6This result applies to connection bias only. Below I consider other biases the editor
might have, which yields more nuanced conclusions.
7Recall that I have remained neutral on how the notion of quality should be inter-
preted. If quality is simply defined as “the number of citations this paper would get if it
were published” the connection between quality and citations is obvious. Even on other
interpretations of quality, citations have frequently been viewed as a good proxy measure
(Cole and Cole 1967, 1968, Medoff 2003). This practice has been defended by Cole and
Cole (1971) and Clark (1957, chapter 3), and criticized by Lindsey (1989) and Heesen
(forthcoming).
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Note also that the results depend on the assumption that σ2sc and σ2rv are
positive. What is the significance of these assumptions?
If σ2rv = 0, i.e., if there is no variance in the reviewer’s report, the re-
viewer’s report describes the quality of the paper with perfect accuracy. In
this case the “extra information” the editor has about authors she knows is
not needed, and so there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality
based on whether the editor knows the author. But it seems unrealistic to
expect reviewer’s reports to be this accurate.
If σ2sc = 0 there is either no difference in the average quality of papers
produced by different authors, or learning the identity of the author does not
tell the editor anything about the expected quality of that scientist’s work.
In this case there is no value to the editor (with regard to determining the
quality of the submitted paper) in learning the identity of the author. So
here also there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality based
on whether the editor knows the author.
Under what circumstances should the identity of the author be expected
to tell the editor something useful about the quality of a submitted paper?
This seems to be most obviously the case in the lab sciences. The identity of
the author, and hence the lab at which the experiments were performed, can
increase or decrease the editor’s confidence that the experiments were per-
formed correctly, including all the little checks and details that are impossible
to describe in such a paper. In a scientific paper, “[a]s long as the conclu-
sions depend at least in part on the results of some experiment, the reader
must rely on the author’s (and perhaps referee’s) testimony that the author
really performed the experiment exactly as claimed, and that it worked out
as reported” (Easwaran 2009, p. 359).
But in other fields, in particular mathematics and some or all of the
humanities, there is no need to rely on the author’s reputation. This is
because in these fields the paper itself is the contribution, so it is possible to
judge papers in isolation of how or by whom they were created. Easwaran
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(2009) discusses this in detail for mathematics, and briefly (in his section 4)
for philosophy. And in fact there exists a norm that this is how they should
be judged: “Papers will rely only on premises that the competent reader
can be assumed to antecedently believe, and only make inferences that the
competent reader would be expected to accept on her own consideration.”
(Easwaran 2009, p. 354).
Arguably then, the advantage (see theorem 3 and proposition 4) conferred
by revealing identity information about the author to the editor applies only
in certain fields. The relevant fields are those where part of the information
in the paper is conferred on the authority of testimony, in particular those
where experimental results are reported. Even in those fields, of course, what
is being testified is supposed to be reproducible by the reader. But this is still
different from the case in mathematics and the humanities, where a careful
reading of a paper itself constitutes a reproduction of its argument. In these
latter fields there is no relevant information to be learned from the identity
of the author (i.e., σ2sc = 0), or, at least, the publishing norms in these fields
suggest that their members believe this to be the case.
3 Bias As an Epistemic Injustice
The previous section discussed a formal model of editorial uncertainty about
paper quality. The first main result, theorem 3, established the existence of
connection bias in this model: authors known by the editor are more likely
to see their paper accepted than authors unknown to the editor. The second
main result, proposition 4, showed that connection bias benefits the readers
of the journal by improving the average quality of accepted papers.
Despite the benefit to the readers, I claim that authors are harmed by
connection bias. In this section I argue that an instance of connection bias
constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker (2007). Then I argue
that the editor is likely to display other biases as well, and that instances of
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these also constitute epistemic injustices.
The type of epistemic justice that is relevant here is testimonial injustice.
Fricker (2007, pp. 17–23) defines a testimonial injustice as a case where
a speaker suffers a credibility deficit for which the hearer is ethically and
epistemically culpable, rather than being due to innocent error.
Testimonial injustices may arise in various ways. Fricker is particularly
interested in what she calls “the central case of testimonial injustice” (Fricker
2007, p. 28). This kind of injustice results from a negative identity-prejudicial
stereotype, which is defined as follows:
A widely held disparaging association between a social group and
one or more attributes, where this association embodies a gen-
eralization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable)
resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective
investment. (Fricker 2007, p. 35)
Because the stereotype is widely held, it produces systematic testimonial
injustice: the relevant social group will suffer a credibility deficit in many
different social spheres.
Applying this to the phenomenon of connection bias, it is clear that this is
not an instance of the central case of testimonial injustice. This would entail
that there is some negative stereotype associated with scientists unknown to
the editor, as a group, which is not normally the case. So I set the central
case aside (I return to it below) and focus on the question whether connection
bias can produce (non-central cases of) testimonial injustice.
Suppose scientist i and scientist i′ tend to produce papers of the same
quality, which is above average in the population (µi = µi′ > µ). Suppose
further that the actual papers they have produced on this occasion are of the
same quality (qi = qi′) and have received similar reviewer reports (ri = ri′).
If scientist i is not known to the editor, but scientist i′ is, then the paper
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written by scientist i′ is likely to be evaluated more highly by the editor.8
If the publication threshold q∗ is somewhere in between the two evaluations
then only scientist i′ will have her paper accepted.
In this example, the scientists produced papers of equal quality that were
evaluated differently. So scientist i suffers a credibility deficit. This deficit
is not due to innocent error, as it would be if, e.g., random variation led to
different reviewer reports (i.e., ri < ri′). The deficit is also not due to the
editor’s use of generally reliable information about the two scientists, as it
would be if there was a genuine difference in the average quality of the papers
they produce (i.e., µi < µi′).
Is this credibility deficit suffered by scientist i ethically and epistemically
culpable on the part of the editor? On the one hand, as I stressed in section 2,
the editor is simply making maximal use of the information available to her.
It just so happens that she has more information about scientists she knows
than about others. But that is hardly the editor’s fault: she cannot be
expected to know everyone’s work. Is it incumbent upon her to get to know
the work of every scientist who submits a paper?
This may well be too much to ask. But an alternative option is to remove
all information about the authors of submitted papers. This can be done by
using a triple-blind reviewing procedure, in which the editor does not know
the identity of the author, and hence is prevented from using information
about scientists she knows in her evaluation. Using such a procedure, at
least all scientists are treated equally: any scientist who writes a paper of a
given quality has the same chance of seeing that paper accepted.
So a credibility deficit occurs which harms scientist i: her paper is re-
jected. Moreover, it harms her specifically as an epistemic agent: the rejec-
tion of the paper reflects a judgment of the quality of her scientific work. And
8The editor’s posterior mean for the quality of scientist i’s paper is µUi and her posterior
mean for scientist i′’s paper is µKi′ = µKi , with µUi < µKi′ whenever σ2sc(ri − µi) < (σ2qu +
σ2rv)(µi − µ). The claim in the text is then justified by the fact that Pr(σ2sc(ri − µi) <
(σ2qu + σ2rv)(µi − µ) | µi > µ) > 1/2, assuming σ2sc > 0 and σ2rv > 0.
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this harm could have been prevented by the editor by using a triple-blind
reviewing procedure.
I conclude that the editor is ethically and epistemically culpable for this
credibility deficit, and hence a testimonial injustice is committed against
scientist i. However, one may insist that it cannot be the case that the
editor is committing a wrong simply in virtue of using relevant information
that is available to her. An evidentialist in particular may say that it cannot
possibly be an epistemic wrong to take into account all relevant information.
I disagree, for the reasons just given, but I need not insist on this point.
Even if it is granted that the editor does not commit an injustice by using
the information that is available to her, the end result is still that scientist i
is harmed as an epistemic agent. She has produced a paper of equal quality
to scientist i′’s, and yet it is not published.
Moreover, the presence of scientist i′ is irrelevant. Any time a paper
from an author unknown to the editor is rejected which would have been
accepted had the editor known the author (all else being equal), that author
is harmed. So even if one insists that differential editorial treatment resulting
from connection bias is not culpable on the part of the editor, connection bias
still harms authors whenever it influences acceptance decisions.
In the model of section 2, and the above discussion, I assumed that con-
nection bias is the only bias journal editors display. The literature on im-
plicit bias suggests that this is not true. For example, “[i]f submissions are
not anonymous to the editor, then the evidence suggests that women’s work
will probably be judged more negatively than men’s work of the same qual-
ity” (Saul 2013, p. 45). Evidence for this claim is given by Wennerås and
Wold (1997), Valian (1999, chapter 11), Steinpreis et al. (1999), Budden
et al. (2008), and Moss-Racusin et al. (2012).9 So women scientists are at
9These citations show that the work of women in academia is undervalued in various
ways. None of them focus specifically on editor evaluations, but they support Saul’s claim
unless it is assumed that journal editors as a group are significantly less biased than other
academics.
17
a disadvantage simply because of their gender identity. Similar biases exist
based on other irrelevant aspects of scientists’ identity, such as race or sex-
ual orientation (see Lee et al. 2013, for a critical survey of various biases in
the peer review system). As Crandall (1982, p. 208) puts it: “The editorial
process has tended to be run as an informal, old-boy network which has ex-
cluded minorities, women, younger researchers, and those from lower-prestige
institutions”.
I use identity bias to refer to these kinds of biases. Any time a paper is
rejected because of identity bias (i.e., the paper would have been accepted
if the relevant part of the author’s identity had been different, all else being
equal), a testimonial injustice occurs for the same reasons outlined above.
Moreover, here the editor is culpable for having these biases.
Unlike instances resulting from connection bias, testimonial injustices
resulting from identity bias can be instances of the central case of tes-
timonial injustice, in which the credibility deficit results from a negative
identity-prejudicial stereotype. The evidence suggests that negative identity-
prejudicial stereotypes affect the way people (not just men) judge women’s
work, even when the person judging does not consciously believe in these
stereotypes. Moreover, those who think highly of their ability to judge work
objectively and/or are primed with objectivity are affected more rather than
less (Uhlmann and Cohen 2007, Stewart and Payne 2008, p. 1333). Similar
claims plausibly hold for biases based on race or sexual orientation. Bi-
ases based on academic affiliation are not usually due to negative identity-
prejudicial stereotypes, as these do not generally affect other aspects of the
scientist’s life.
So both connection bias and identity bias are responsible for injustices
against authors. This is one way to spell out the claim that authors are
harmed when journal editors do not use a triple-blind reviewing procedure.
This constitutes the first kind of argument for triple-blind reviewing which
I mentioned in the introduction, and which I endorse based on these consid-
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erations.
4 The Effect of Bias on Quality
The second kind of argument I mentioned in the introduction claims that
failing to use triple-blind reviewing harms the journal and its readers, because
it would lower the average quality of accepted papers. In section 2 I argued
that connection bias actually has the opposite effect: it increases average
quality. In this section I complicate the model to include identity bias.
Recall that the editor displays identity bias if she is more or less likely
to publish papers from a certain group of scientists based on some aspect of
their identity, e.g., their gender. I incorporate this in the model by assuming
the editor consistently undervalues members of one group (and overvalues the
others). More precisely, she believes the average quality of papers produced
by any scientist i from the group she is biased against to be lower than it
really is by some constant quantity ε. Conversely, the average quality of
papers written by any scientist not belonging to this group is raised by δ.10
So the editor has a different prior for the two groups; I use piA to denote her
prior for the quality of papers written by scientists she is biased against, and
piF for her prior for scientists she is biased in favor of.
As before, the editor may be familiar with a given scientist’s work (i.e.,
she knows the average quality of that scientist’s papers) or not. So there
are now four groups. If scientist i is known to the editor and belongs to the
stigmatized group the editor’s prior distribution on the quality of scientist i’s
paper is piA(qi | µi) ∼ N(µi− ε, σ2qu). If scientist i is known to the editor but
is not in the stigmatized group the prior is piF (qi | µi) ∼ N(µi + δ, σ2qu). If
10This is a simplifying assumption: one could imagine having biases against multiple
groups of different strengths, or biases whose strength has some random variation, or biases
which intersect in various ways (Collins and Chepp 2013, Bright et al. 2016). However,
the assumption in the main text suffices to make the point I want to make. It should be
fairly straightforward to extend my results to more complicated cases like the ones just
described.
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scientist i is not known to the editor and is in the stigmatized group the prior
is piA(qi) ∼ N(µ− ε, σ2qu + σ2sc). And if scientist i is not known to the editor
and not in the stigmatized group the prior is piF (qi) ∼ N(µ+ δ, σ2qu + σ2sc).11
The next few steps in the development are analogous to that in section 2.
After the reviewer’s report comes in the editor updates her beliefs about the
quality of the paper, yielding the following posterior distributions.
Proposition 5.
piA(qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKAi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
)
,
piF (qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKFi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
)
,
piA(qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUAi ,
(σ2qu + σ2sc)σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
)
,
piF (qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUFi ,
(σ2qu + σ2sc)σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
)
,
where
µKAi = µKi −
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
, µKFi = µKi +
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
,
µUAi = µUi −
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
, µUFi = µUi +
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
.
As before, the paper is published if the posterior mean (µKAi , µKFi , µUAi ,
or µUFi ) exceeds the threshold q∗. The respective distributions of the posterior
11Note that I assume that the editor displays bias against scientists in the stigmatized
group regardless of whether she knows them or not. Under a reviewing procedure that is
not triple-blind, the editor learns at least the name and affiliation of any scientist who sub-
mits a paper. This information is usually sufficient to determine with reasonable certainty
the scientist’s gender. So at least for gender bias it seems reasonable to expect the editor
to display bias even against scientists she does not know. Conversely, because negative
identity-prejudicial stereotypes can work unconsciously, it does not seem reasonable to
expect that the editor can withhold her bias from scientists she knows.
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means determine how likely this is. These distributions are given in the next
proposition.
Proposition 6. The posterior means are normally distributed, with
µKAi ∼ N
(
µ− ε · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
, σ2K
)
,
µKFi ∼ N
(
µ+ δ · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
, σ2K
)
,
µUAi ∼ N
(
µ− ε · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
, σ2U
)
,
µUFi ∼ N
(
µ+ δ · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
, σ2U
)
.
This yields the within-group acceptance rates and the unsurprising result
that the editor is less likely to publish papers by scientists she is biased
against.
Theorem 7. If ε > 0, δ > 0, and σ2rv > 0, the acceptance probability for
authors the editor is biased against is lower than the acceptance probability
for authors the editor is biased in favor of (keeping fixed whether or not the
editor knows the author). That is,
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗) < Pr (µKFi > q∗) and Pr (µUAi > q∗) < Pr (µUFi > q∗) .
Theorem 7 establishes the existence of identity bias in the model: authors
that are subject to a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype are less likely to
see their paper accepted than authors who are not. As I argued in section 3,
whenever a paper is rejected due to identity bias this constitutes a testimonial
injustice against the author.
Now I turn my attention to the effect that identity bias has on the average
quality of accepted papers. In the current version of the model there is both
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connection bias and identity bias. Connection bias has been shown to have
a positive effect on average quality (see section 2). Whether the net effect of
connection bias and identity bias is positive or negative depends on various
parameters, as I illustrate below.
The benchmark for judging the average quality of accepted papers under
a procedure subject to connection bias and identity bias is a triple-blind
reviewing procedure under which the editor is not informed of the identity
of the scientist. As a result, she is both unable to use information about
the average quality of a given scientist’s papers and unable to display bias
against scientists based on their identity.
Under this triple-blind procedure, the editor’s prior distribution for the
quality of any submitted paper is pi(qi) ∼ N(µ, σ2qu+σ2sc), i.e., the prior I used
in section 2 when the author was unknown to the editor. Hence, under this
procedure, the posterior is pi(qi | ri), the posterior mean is µUi ∼ N(µ, σ2U),
the probability of acceptance is Pr(µUi > q∗) and the average quality of
accepted papers is E[qi | µUi > q∗].
In contrast, I refer to the reviewing procedure that is subject to connection
bias and identity bias as the non-blind procedure. The overall probability that
a paper is accepted under the non-blind procedure depends on the relative
sizes of the four groups. I use pKA to denote the fraction of scientists known to
the editor that she is biased against, pKF for the fraction known to the editor
that she is biased in favor of, pUA for unknown scientists biased against, and
pUF for unknown scientists biased in favor of. These fractions are nonnegative
and sum to one.
Let Ai denote the event that scientist i’s paper is accepted under the non-
blind procedure. The overall probability of acceptance under this procedure
is
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Pr (Ai) = pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗)+ pKF Pr (µKFi > q∗)
+ pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗)+ pUF Pr (µUFi > q∗) .
The average quality of accepted papers can then be written as E[qi | Ai]. I
want to compare E[qi | Ai] to E[qi | µUi > q∗], the average quality of accepted
papers under a triple-blind procedure.12
In the remainder of this section I assume that the editor’s biases are such
that she believes the average quality of all submitted papers to be equal
to µ. In other words, her bias against the stigmatized group is canceled
out on average by her bias in favor of those not in the stigmatized group,
weighted by the relative sizes of those groups:
(pKA + pUA) ε = (pKF + pUF ) δ.
I use the above equation to fix the value of δ, reducing the number of free
parameters by one. The equation amounts to a kind of commensurability
requirement for the two procedures because it guarantees that the editor
perceives the average quality of submitted papers to be the same regardless
of whether or not a triple-blind procedure is used.
As far as I can tell there are no interesting general conditions on the
parameter values that determine whether the non-blind procedure or the
triple-blind procedure will lead to a higher average quality of accepted papers.
The question I will explore now, using some numerical examples, is how
biased the editor needs to be for the epistemic costs of her identity bias to
outweigh the epistemic benefits resulting from connection bias.
In order to generate numerical data values have to be chosen for the
12Expressions for Pr(Ai) and E[qi | Ai] using only the parameter values and standard
functions are given in lemma 11 in appendix A. These expressions are used to generate
the numerical results below.
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parameters. First I set µ = 0 and q∗ = 2. Since quality is an interval scale in
this model, these choices are arbitrary. For the variances σ2qu, σ2sc, and σ2rv, I
choose a “small” and a “large” value (1 and 4 respectively).
For the sizes of the four groups, I assume that there is no correlation
between whether the editor knows an author and whether the editor has a
bias against that author (so, e.g., the percentage of women among scientists
the editor knows is equal to the percentage of women among scientists the
editor does not know). I consider two cases for the editor’s identity bias:
either she is biased against half the set of authors (and so biased in favor
of the other half) or the group she is biased against is a 30 % minority.13
Similarly, I consider the case in which the editor knows half of all scientists
submitting papers, and the case in which the editor knows 30 % of them.
As a result, there are 32 possible settings of the parameters (23 choices for
the variances times 22 choices for the group sizes). Whether the triple-blind
procedure or the non-blind procedure is epistemically preferable depends on
the value of ε (and the value of δ determined thereby).
It follows from proposition 4 that when ε = 0 the non-blind procedure
helps rather than harms the readers of the journal by increasing average
quality relative to the triple-blind procedure. If ε is positive but relatively
small, this remains true, but when ε is relatively big, the non-blind procedure
harms the readers. This is because the average quality of published papers
under the non-blind procedure decreases continuously as ε increases (I do
not prove this, but it is easily checked for the 32 cases I consider).
The interesting question, then, is where the turning point lies. How big
does the editor’s bias need to be in order for the negative effects of identity
bias on quality to cancel out the positive effects of connection bias?
13Bruner and O’Connor (forthcoming) note that certain dynamics in academic life can
lead to identity bias against groups as a result of the mere fact that they are a minority.
Here I consider both the case where the stigmatized group is a minority (and is possibly
stigmatized as a result of being a minority, as Bruner and O’Connor suggest) and the case
where it is not (and so presumably the negative identity-prejudicial stereotype has some
other source).
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I determine the value of ε for which the average quality of published
papers under the non-blind procedure and the triple-blind procedure is the
same for each of the 32 cases. But reporting these numbers directly does not
seem particularly useful, as ε is measured in “quality points” which do not
have a clear interpretation outside of the model.
To give a more meaningful interpretation of these values of ε as measur-
ing “size of bias”, I calculate the average rate of acceptance of papers from
authors the editor is biased against and the average rate of acceptance of
papers from authors the editor is biased in favor of.14 The difference be-
tween these numbers gives an indication of the size of the editor’s bias: it
measures (in percentage points, abbreviated pp) how many more papers the
editor accepts from authors she is biased in favor of, compared to those she
is biased against.
This difference is reported for the 32 cases in figure 1. To provide a sense
of scale for these numbers, I plot them against the acceptance rate that the
triple-blind procedure would have for those values of the parameters, i.e.,
Pr(µUi > q∗).
Already with this small sample of 32 cases, a large variation of results
can be observed. I illustrate this by looking at two cases in detail.
First, suppose that σ2qu = σ2sc = 1 and σ2rv = 4. In this extreme case
the triple-blind procedure has an acceptance rate as low as 0.72 %. If the
groups are all of equal size (pKA = pKF = pUA = pUF = 1/4) then under the
non-blind procedure the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased in
favor of needs to be as much as 2.66 pp higher than the acceptance rate for
authors the editor is biased against, in order for the average quality under
14These are calculated without regard for whether the editor knows the author or not.
In particular, the rate of acceptance for authors the editor is biased against is
pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗)+ pUA Pr (µUAi > q∗)
pKA + pUA
, and
pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗)+ pUF Pr (µUFi > q∗)
pKF + pUF
is the rate of acceptance for authors the editor is biased in favor of.
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Figure 1: The minimum size of the editor’s bias such that the quality costs
of the non-blind procedure outweigh its benefits (given as a percentage point
difference in acceptance rates), in 32 cases, plotted as a function of the ac-
ceptance rate of the corresponding triple-blind procedure.
the two procedures to be equal. Clearly a 2.66 pp bias is very large for a
journal that only accepts less than 1 % of papers. If the bias is any less than
that there is no harm to the readers in using the non-blind procedure.
Second, suppose that σ2qu = σ2sc = 4 and σ2rv = 1. Then the triple-
blind procedure has an acceptance rate of 22.66 %. If, moreover, the editor
knows relatively few authors (pKA = pKF = 0.15, pUA = pUF = 0.35) then
the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased in favor of needs to be
only 2.23 pp higher than the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased
against, in order for the quality costs of the non-blind procedure to outweigh
its benefits. For a journal accepting about 23 % of papers that means that
even if the identity bias of the editor is relatively mild the journal’s readers
are harmed if the non-blind procedure is used.
Based on these results, and the fact that the parameter values are un-
likely to be known in practice, it is unclear whether the non-blind procedure
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or the triple-blind procedure will lead to a higher average quality of pub-
lished papers for any particular journal.15 So in general it is not clear that
an argument that the non-blind procedure harms the journal’s readers can be
made. At the same time, a general argument that the non-blind procedure
helps the readers is not available either. Given this, I am inclined to recom-
mend a triple-blind procedure for all journals because not doing so harms
the authors.
If there was reason to believe that the editor’s bias was very small, there
might be a case for the non-blind procedure using considerations of average
quality. Based on the empirical evidence I cited in section 3, it seems unlikely
that any editor could make such a case convincingly today. But if identity
bias were someday to be eliminated or severely mitigated, this question may
be worth revisiting.
So far I have argued in this section that in the presence of the positive
effect of connection bias on quality, the net effect of connection bias and
identity bias on quality is unclear. But I argued in section 2 that the positive
effect of connection bias may only exist in certain fields. In fields where
papers rely partially on the author’s testimony there is value in knowing the
identity of the author. But in other fields such as mathematics and some
of the humanities testimony is not taken to play a role—the paper itself
constitutes the contribution to the field—and so arguably there is no value
in knowing the identity of the author.
In those fields, then, there is no quality benefit from connection bias, but
there is still a quality cost from identity bias. So here the strongest case for
the triple-blind procedure emerges, as the non-blind procedure harms both
authors and readers.
15Note that the evidence collected by Laband and Piette (1994) does not help settle this
question, as they do not directly compare the triple-blind and the non-blind procedure.
Their evidence supports a positive epistemic effect of connection bias, but not a verdict
on the overall epistemic effect of triple-blinding.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper I have considered two types of arguments for triple-blind re-
view: one based on the consequences for the author and one based on the
consequences for the readers of the journal.
I have argued that the non-blind procedure introduces differential treat-
ment of scientific authors. In particular, editors are more likely to publish
papers by authors they know (connection bias, theorem 3) and less likely
to publish papers by authors they apply negative identity-prejudicial stereo-
types to (identity bias, theorem 7). Whenever a paper is rejected as a result
of one of these biases an epistemic injustice (in the sense of Fricker 2007) is
committed against the author. This is an argument in favor of triple-blinding
based on consequences for the author.
From the readers’ perspective the story is more mixed. Generally speak-
ing connection bias has a positive effect on the quality of published papers
and identity bias a negative one. Thus whether the readers are better off
under the triple-blind procedure depends on how exactly these effects trade
off, which is highly context-dependent, or so I have argued. This yields a
more nuanced view than that suggested by either Laband and Piette (1994),
who focus only on connection bias, or by the argument for triple-blinding
based on the consequences for the readers, which focuses only on identity
bias.
However, in mathematics and some of the humanities there is arguably
no positive quality effect from connection bias, as knowing about an author’s
other work is not taken to be relevant (Easwaran 2009). So here the negative
effect of identity bias is the only relevant consideration from the readers’
perspective. In this situation, considerations concerning the consequences for
the author and considerations concerning the consequences for the readers
point in the same direction: in favor of triple-blind review.
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A The Acceptance Probability and the Aver-
age Quality of Papers
Proposition 2. µUi ∼ N (µ, σ2U) and µKi ∼ N (µ, σ2K). Moreover, σ2U < σ2K
whenever σ2sc > 0 and σ2rv > 0.
Proof. First consider the distribution of ri. Since ri | qi ∼ N(qi, σ2rv), qi |
µi ∼ N(µi, σ2qu), and µi ∼ N(µ, σ2sc), it follows that ri | µi ∼ N(µi, σ2qu + σ2rv)
and ri ∼ N(µ, σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv).
The latter can be used straightforwardly to determine the distribution
of µUi . Since ri − µ ∼ N(0, σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv) it follows that
σ2qu + σ2sc
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
(ri − µ) ∼ N
(
0,
(σ2qu + σ2sc)2
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
)
∼ N
(
0, σ2U
)
.
The result follows because µ is a constant and
µUi =
σ2qu + σ2sc
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
µ =
σ2qu + σ2sc
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
(ri − µ) + µ.
Determining the distribution of µKi is slightly trickier because there are
two random variables involved: ri and µi. As noted above, ri | µi ∼
N(µi, σ2qu + σ2rv). Thus, writing Xi =
σ2qu
σ2qu+σ2rv
(ri − µi),
Xi | µi ∼ N
(
0,
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ2rv
)
.
Since
µKi =
σ2qu
σ2qu + σ2rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
µi = Xi + µi
it remains to determine the convolution of Xi and µi. This can be done using
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the moment-generating function and the law of total expectation. Recall
that the moment-generating function of an N(m, s2) distribution is given by
M(t) = exp{mt+ 12s2t2}. So the moment-generating function of µKi is
E[exp{tµKi }] = E[exp{t(Xi + µi)}]
= E[E[exp{tXi + tµi} | µi]]
= E[exp{tµi}E[exp{tXi} | µi]]
= exp
{
0t+ 12
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ2rv
t2
}
E[exp{tµi}]
= exp
{
1
2
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ2rv
t2 + µt+ 12σ
2
sct
2
}
= exp
{
µt+ 12
σ4qu + σ2sc(σ2qu + σ2rv)
σ2qu + σ2rv
t2
}
,
which is exactly the moment-generating function of the desired normal dis-
tribution.
Finally, note that
σ2U =
(σ2qu + σ2sc)2(σ2qu + σ2rv)
(σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv)(σ2qu + σ2rv)
,
σ2K =
(σ2qu + σ2sc)2(σ2qu + σ2rv) + σ2scσ4rv
(σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv)(σ2qu + σ2rv)
.
So σ2U < σ2K whenever σ2sc > 0 and σ2rv > 0 (and σ2U = σ2K otherwise, assuming
the expressions are well-defined in that case).
Theorem 3. Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
> Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
if q∗ > µ, σ2sc > 0, and σ2rv > 0.
Proof. It follows from proposition 2 that
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Pr
(
µKi > q
∗) = 1− Φ(q∗ − µ
σK
)
and Pr
(
µUi > q
∗) = 1− Φ(q∗ − µ
σU
)
,
where Φ is the distribution function (or cumulative density function) of a
standard normal distribution. Since Φ is (strictly) increasing in its argument,
and σK > σU by proposition 2, the theorem follows immediately.
In order to prove proposition 4 a number of intermediate results are
needed.
Lemma 8.
E[qi | µUi > q∗] = E[µUi | µUi > q∗],
E[qi | µKi > q∗] = E[µKi | µKi > q∗].
Proof. Because µUi is simply an (invertible) transformation of ri, it follows
that
qi | µUi ∼ qi | ri ∼ N
(
µUi ,
(σ2qu + σ2sc)σ2rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
)
.
The distribution of qi | µKi is a little trickier to find, because µKi is a linear
combination of two random variables, ri and µi, and it is not obvious that
learning µKi is as informative as learning both ri and µi. But using the known
distributions of qi | µi and µKi | qi, µi and integrating out µi it can be shown
that
qi | µKi ∼ qi | ri, µi ∼ N
(
µKi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
)
.
The important point here is that E[qi | µxi ] = µxi both for x = U and x = K.
Now the law of total expectation can be used to establish that
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E[qi | µxi > q∗] = E[E[qi | µxi ] | µxi > q∗] = E[µxi | µxi > q∗],
for x = U,K.
Let X ∼ N(µ, σ2) be a normally distributed random variable. Then
X | X > a follows a left-truncated normal distribution, with left-truncation
point a. As a result of lemma 8 I am interested in the mean of left-truncated
normal distributions. According to, e.g., Johnson et al. (1994, chapter 13,
section 10.1), this mean can be expressed as
E[X | X > a] = µ+ σR
(
a− µ
σ
)
. (1)
Here
R(x) = φ(x)1− Φ(x)
for all x ∈ R, where φ is the probability density function of the standard
normal distribution, and Φ is its distribution function. R is the inverse of
what is known in the literature (e.g., Gordon 1941) as Mills’ ratio.
It follows from the definitions that R(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R and that
R′(x) = R(x)2 − xR(x). (2)
Proposition 9 (Gordon (1941)). For all x > 0, R(x) < x2+1
x
.
Proposition 9 can be used to establish the next result.
Proposition 10. If X ∼ N(µ, σ2) and Y ∼ N(µ, s2) with s > σ > 0 then
E[Y | Y > a] > E[X | X > a].
Proof. It suffices to show that the derivative ∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] is positive for
all σ > 0. Differentiating equation (1) (using equation (2)) yields
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∂∂σ
E[X | X > a] =
((
a− µ
σ
)2
+ 1
)
R
(
a− µ
σ
)
− a− µ
σ
R
(
a− µ
σ
)2
.
Since R
(
a−µ
σ
)
> 0, ∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] > 0 if and only if
(
a− µ
σ
)2
+ 1− a− µ
σ
R
(
a− µ
σ
)
> 0.
This is true whenever a−µ
σ
≤ 0 because then both terms in the sum are
positive. Proposition 9 guarantees that it is true whenever a−µ
σ
> 0 as well.
Proposition 4. E[qi | µKi > q∗] > E[qi | µUi > q∗] whenever σ2sc > 0, and
σ2rv > 0.
Proof. By lemma 8,
E[qi | µUi > q∗] = E[µUi | µUi > q∗],
E[qi | µKi > q∗] = E[µKi | µKi > q∗].
By proposition 2, µUi ∼ N (µ, σ2U) and µKi ∼ N (µ, σ2K), with σU < σK . Hence
the conditions of proposition 10 are satisfied, and the result follows.
Proposition 6.
µKAi ∼ N
(
µ− ε · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
, σ2K
)
,
µKFi ∼ N
(
µ+ δ · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
, σ2K
)
,
µUAi ∼ N
(
µ− ε · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
, σ2U
)
,
µUFi ∼ N
(
µ+ δ · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
, σ2U
)
.
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Proof. Since µKAi and µKFi are simply µKi shifted by a constant (see propo-
sition 5) they follow the same distribution as µKi except that its mean is
shifted by the same constant. Similarly µUAi and µUFi are just µUi shifted by
a constant. So the results follow from proposition 2.
For notational convenience, I introduce qKA, qKF , qUA, and qUF , defined
by
qKA = q∗ + ε · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
, qKF = q∗ − δ · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2rv
,
qUA = q∗ + ε · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
, qUF = q∗ − δ · σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ2sc + σ2rv
.
Theorem 7. If ε > 0, δ > 0, and σ2rv > 0,
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗) < Pr (µKFi > q∗) and Pr (µUAi > q∗) < Pr (µUFi > q∗) .
Proof. For the first inequality, note that
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗) = 1− Φ(qKA − µ
σK
)
< 1− Φ
(
qKF − µ
σK
)
= Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗) .
The equalities follow from the distributions of the posterior means established
in proposition 6. The inequality follows from the fact that Φ is strictly
increasing in its argument. By the same reasoning,
Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗) = 1− Φ(qUA − µ
σU
)
< 1− Φ
(
qUF − µ
σU
)
= Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗) .
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Lemma 11.
Pr (Ai) = pKA
(
1− Φ
(
qKA − µ
σK
))
+ pKF
(
1− Φ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+ pUA
(
1− Φ
(
qUA − µ
σU
))
+ pUF
(
1− Φ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
E [qi | Ai] = µ+ σKPr (Ai)
(
pKAφ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
+ pKFφ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+ σUPr (Ai)
(
pUAφ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
+ pUFφ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
Proof. The expression for Pr(Ai) follows immediately from the distributions
of the posterior means established in proposition 6.
To get an expression for E[qi | Ai], consider first the average quality of
scientist i’s paper given that it is accepted and given that scientist i is in
the group of scientists known to the editor that the editor is biased against.
This average quality is
E
[
qi | µKAi > q∗
]
= E
[
qi | µKi > qKA
]
= E
[
µKi | µKi > qKA
]
= µ+ σKR
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
,
where the first equality simply rewrites the inequality µKAi > q∗ in a more
convenient form, the second equality uses lemma 8, and the third equality
uses equation 1. Similarly,
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E
[
qi | µKFi > q∗
]
= µ+ σKR
(
qKF − µ
σK
)
,
E
[
qi | µUAi > q∗
]
= µ+ σUR
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
,
E
[
qi | µUFi > q∗
]
= µ+ σUR
(
qUF − µ
σU
)
.
The average quality of accepted papers E[qi | Ai] is a weighted sum of these
expectations. The weights are given by the proportion of accepted papers
that are written by a scientist in that particular group. For example, au-
thors known to the editor that she is biased against form a pKA Pr(µKAi >
q∗)/Pr(Ai) proportion of accepted papers. Hence
E [qi | Ai] = 1Pr (Ai)pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗)E [qi | µKAi > q∗]
+ 1Pr (Ai)
pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗)E [qi | µKFi > q∗]
+ 1Pr (Ai)
pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗)E [qi | µUAi > q∗]
+ 1Pr (Ai)
pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗)E [qi | µUFi > q∗]
= µ+ σKPr (Ai)
(
pKAφ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
+ pKFφ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+ σUPr (Ai)
(
pUAφ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
+ pUFφ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
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